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Section 1: Introduction
The United States Equity funds market has been a popular and expanding section of the
stock market. As shown in Figure A pulled from Statista, the U.S. mutual funds market has more
than tripled in value from 5.54 trillion dollars in 1998 to 17.71 trillion dollars in 2018 (Nace,
2019). U.S. equity funds, also known as U.S. stock funds, accounted for 41% (roughly 7.26
trillion dollars) of the mutual funds market in 2018 and have shown continued growth being
valued at 8.6 trillion dollars in June of 2019 (Nace, 2019). The sheer magnitude of the market
proves the importance of this research and as to why investors should carefully monitor the
changes and trends in the U.S. stock funds market. Also, U.S. equity funds are very promising
portfolio choices for both the retail and institutional investor, as they provide diversification with
steady returns.
The U.S. mutual funds industry has been around for almost a century. The creation of this
industry started in 1929 with the formation of MIT, Massachusetts Investors Trust, which was the
first open-end fund (Hubbard 2010). Soon after, many more came into existence and these funds
started to gain lots of popularity very quickly. By 1950, total assets under management in the
industry had grown to $2.5 billion and to $17 billion by 1960 (Hubbard 2010). Also, according to
literature written by Glenn Hubbard from the Columbia University Press, U.S. mutual funds
became the “bedrock foundation for retirement saving in the United States” (Hubbard 2010). This
further proves the quality and importance of investing in mutual funds, as they provide enough
diversification with steady returns and low volatility to investors leading these securities to
become the cornerstone of retirement investing.
Returning to the present day and taking a closer look into this massive market, viewers
can quickly find that U.S. stock funds can be split into two main categories that compete against
one another. These include actively managed funds and passively managed funds. Throughout the
remainder of this paper, actively managed funds, active funds and actives will be used
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interchangeably, as well as the use of passively managed funds, passive funds, passives, indexed
funds and ETF’s. The competition between these two types of funds has helped propel the market
forward, along with macroeconomic events and the intense innovation of technology. All these
factors have led to large amounts of changes and trends in this market that have shown great
impact on many aspects of both actively managed and indexed funds. This research looks at many
of these aspects such as fluctuating stock fund returns and asset retention, investor preferences,
fund management style and expense ratios to explain the changes and trends that were present in
this market over the past twenty years. This analysis also aims to help explain the complex
relationship between actively managed and passively managed funds as well as provide insight on
where this market will be headed in the future.
To best illustrate the relationship between actively managed and passive funds, a sample
of sixty funds are used throughout the remainder of this research. More specifically, thirty
actively managed funds are introduced along with thirty passively managed funds. Included with
these funds are data fields that provide the most applicable information. Overall, more than 6,000
data points are tested. Therefore, this research holds strong testing power and is a relevant source
of support to any and all findings that will be discussed later.

Section 2: Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
Asset Fluctuation Over the Past Twenty Years
Over the past twenty years, the stock market, along with U.S. equity funds, have seen
incredible growth. According to a Morningstar article written by Tom Lauricella and Gabrielle
DiBenedetto, actively managed U.S. stock funds had 6.5 times more assets than indexed funds in
1998 (Lauricella and DiBenedetto, 2019). With the enormous size of this industry, even twenty
years ago, the 6.5 times difference in assets between the actives and passives is massive. The
article then goes on to state that actively managed funds have been consistently losing assets and
popularity to passively managed ones. As a result, the amount of assets that are kept in actively
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managed funds is currently equal to the amount of assets in indexed funds. With this massive gap
in the difference of assets being closed in just twenty years, it effectively outlines the alarming
growth rate that indexed funds are experiencing along with the concerning slowdown of active
funds. This issue grabs a lot of attention and will be discussed later in the section as a research
question of this study. Also, as shown in Figure B, actively managed funds have seen outflows of
assets to passively managed funds in the past eleven out of twelve years (Lauricella and
DiBenedetto, 2019). Not only have actively managed funds been losing popularity and assets
over the past twenty years, this data proves that it is not a fluke or some arbitrary pattern but a
consistent fluctuation of assets from actives to passives.
To provide a more in-depth look at the fluctuation of assets between these two types of
funds and the overall relationships between active funds and indexed funds, the twenty-year time
period is split up into three subperiod sections. The three time periods include the Dot.COM
bubble burst from 2000 to 2004, the 2008 Financial Crisis from 2005 to 2013 and the rapid
recovery and rise of the market from 2014 to 2019. This allows the study to examine and identify
any outliers in the data, as well as display the time periods where actives outperformed passives
and vice versa, as well as many other relationships.

Dot.COM Burst from 2000 to 2004
Starting with the Dot.COM burst of 2000, this historical event dealt with the building of a
bubble due to the rise of the Internet and its relationship with businesses. According to an article
written by Ben Geier from Time Magazine, the bubble began with the growth of Internet users.
As more and more people begin to access the Internet, more and more businesses started
implementing online retail. This drove companies’ growth rates through the roof and resulted in
the NASDAQ growing “from around 1,000 points in 1995 to more than 5,000 in 2000” (Geier
2015). However, the volatility of this growth was alarming and not sustainable, causing huge
losses to lots of online retailer companies. Due to this, the NASDAQ lost almost $1 trillion in
stock value in less than a month, causing a huge collapse in online retailing, while also adding
3

lots of skepticism to the market concerning that area. The effects of this burst were present in the
economy from 2000 to 2002, until the market was able to make a comeback and continue to grow
in 2003.
This time period seems suitable for this research for several reasons. The first and most
obvious one is that it is at the start of the twenty-year time period. Also, the DOT.COM bubble
was a short-lived event, resulting in fewer outliers in the data points of the sample. Therefore,
2000 to 2004 is a suitable five-year time period to best present relationships between active and
passive funds in the past twenty years.

2008 Financial Crisis from 2005 to 2013
The 2008 Financial Crisis is one of the most well-known financial collapses. Referring to
Professor Zhaozhao He’s (UNH) lectures, the 2008 Financial Crisis resulted from the bursting of
a bubble in the real estate market due to the collapse of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), along
with many other reasons such as loosened regulations on bank lending and faulty credit ratings
from agencies. The result of this event led to the Federal Government implementing rounds of
quantitative easing (QE) in hopes of jump-starting financial markets by pumping capital into the
economy.
Based off the sheer size of this event, a much longer time period has been selected when
compared to the other two events. The event led to a peak in 2006, with the crash taking place in
2008 and the quick recovery of the economy in 2009 led by rounds of QE. The volatility that
takes place during this time period could have very interesting effects on the data and likely
provide many outliers. However, this information would still be useful as it provides results and
outlooks to both the relationship between active and passive funds when the market is rising and
falling.

Rapid Recovery and Rise of the Market from 2014 to 2019

4

As seen over the past six years, the market has been rapidly recovering from the 2008
Financial Crisis and rising ever since. According to an article written by Erin Duffin on Statista,
U.S. real GDP has experienced an average growth rate of roughly 2.43% since 2014. Taken from
Yahoo Finance, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) rose from roughly 16,300 points in the
beginning of 2014 to more than 28,500 points at the end of 2019. The immense growth the U.S.
economy has experienced in these past six years creates an interesting, positive environment to
compare active funds to ETFs.
From the literature above, it is very clear that the asset fluctuation active and passive
funds have experienced in the past twenty years is no fluke or coincidence. There seems to be
underlying reasons as to why this has occurred. Using these three specific time periods helps
breakdown the data even further to gather more specific evidence as to why this is occurring.
Also, it provides interesting results when comparing active funds to passive ones in general. Each
environment is different in terms of recession or expansion. By being able to use specific time
periods, it allows the tests to provide greater accuracy when describing relationships between
active and passive funds when specific macro-events are occurring, such as growth or decline.
This adds another layer of data to the results of testing, which would provide for a clearer
prediction to the future of the U.S. equity funds markets.

The Downwards Trend of Actively Managed Funds
Based on passed data and studies, it is quite clear that actively managed funds have been
losing the battle with indexed funds. Risks and returns are a main factor that has caused the rise
of indexed funds; however, they are not the sole influence of this trend. As stated in the name,
actively managed funds are maintained by fund managers that develop strategies in hopes of
generating a higher return than the market. This daunting service brings a lot of uncertainty into
the realm of these types of funds, as fewer than 8% of fund managers over the past fifteen years
have beaten the market (Soe and Liu, 2018). To better explain the opposite trends of actively
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managed and passively managed funds, four other main factors of influence will be introduced in
the upcoming section.

Attractiveness of Indexed Funds
An efficient method of understanding why actively managed funds are losing the battle to
indexed funds is to investigate why passively managed funds have become so popular. The
definition of an indexed fund is a fund that mirrors the composition of an index, for example the
S&P 500. If only 8% of actively managed funds beat the market per year, that means the other
92% of those funds were outperformed by the market and indexed funds, which mimic the market
(Soe and Liu, 2018). This greatly boosts the attractiveness of passively managed funds, as they
have a 92% chance to provide a higher return than that of actively managed funds. The
consistency and diversification that passively managed funds offer is extremely attractive to
investors as it allows mitigating risk while keeping an acceptable return.
Referring to the 2018 SPIVA U.S. Scorecard, the research revealed over a “15-year
investment horizon, 92.43% of large-cap managers, 95.13% of mid-cap managers, and 97.70% of
small-cap managers failed to outperform on a relative basis” (Soe and Liu, 2018). This research
further supports the growing popularity and asset retention that indexed funds are attaining.
Investors understand the extremely low probability of selecting stocks that can outperform the
market and feel much safer investing their money into indexed funds. Low fees, ample amounts
of diversification while offering steady returns are the main factors that have pushed passively
managed funds to the forefront of the U.S. equity funds market.

Fund Manager Style
Fund manager style is the type of stock selections that a fund manager makes based on a
strategy. There are nine different management styles to choose from by mixing investment styles
(growth, core and value) with capitalization levels (large, mid and small) (Soe and Liu, 2018).
Out of the nine investment styles, “large-cap value was the best-performing category over the 10-
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and 15-year horizons, with 23.79% and 16.95% of managers outperforming the benchmark, the
S&P 500 Value”. These metrics give a very weak reputation to actively managed funds as the
best performing fund manager style over a fifteen-year time period was only able to beat their
benchmark of the S&P 500 value index 17% of the time (Soe and Liu, 2018).
The SPIVA U.S. Scorecard also goes into metrics such as style consistency and
survivorship. Survivorship is a measure that “represents the percentage of funds in existence at
the beginning of the time period that is still active at the end of the time period” and style
consistency is a “calculation shows the percentage of funds that had the same style classification
at the end of the time period as at the beginning of the time period” (Soe and Liu, 2018). For the
sake of consistency, the large-cap value fund manager style will be used again, since it is the best
performing strategy over the fifteen-year time period that was provided. This strategy posted a
46.6% survivorship rate and a 32.58% style consistency rate. For survivorship, this means that
around 53% of large-cap value funds present at the beginning of the fifteen-year time period had
either been liquidated or merged. From this metric alone, it is quite clear that the reliability of the
best performing fund manager style is very low, which can prove to be very risky to investors
looking for safe and consistent returns. In terms of style consistency, roughly 68% of all large-cap
value funds at the beginning of the fifteen-year time period were classified as a different
investment strategy. This is very unattractive to investors as it shows that fund managers are
desperately trying to find better ways to generate returns by switching their fund styles. All in all,
fund manager styles play a big role in the downward trend of actively managed funds.

Expense Ratio
Expense ratios are a fee placed upon both actively managed and indexed funds. They are
a necessary cost, as they cut into the return of the investor, but also keep the fund functioning.
However, actively managed funds impose a much higher fee, as the service they provide is much
more intensive than passively managed funds. Looking to the sample of thirty actively managed
funds and thirty indexed funds, the average expense fee for both types of funds are 0.72% and
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0.18% respectively. This 54-basis point spread can make or break a return and also influence an
investment decision to select indexed funds over actively managed funds.
According to an article written by Aaron Back of the Wall Street Journal, T. Rowe Price
saw a $63 million outflow of assets from actively managed funds in just the fourth quarter of
2016 alone (Back, 2017). T. Rowe Price’s expense ratios were floating around 0.70% while
Vanguard passive funds was as low as 0.15%. According to an article from The Journal of
Business published by the University of Chicago Press, investors are more drawn to equity funds
with lower expense ratios and high diversification. “Academic finance advises investors that low
fees are preferable to high fees, that past returns are poor predictors of future returns in the long
run, and that there is little, or no, evidence that active managers can outperform indices. Thus,
investors would be best off choosing any well-diversified mutual fund with low fees” (Barber,
Zheng, and Odean, 2005). With thousands of U.S. stock funds from which investors can choose,
the majority are drawn to indexed funds with low fees, setting actively managed funds on the
downward trend they have and currently are experiencing.

Fund Manager Compensation
Similar to fund manager style, fund manager compensation and performance is an area
that is difficult to research, as most fund manager compensation packages are not released to the
public. However, in an article posted by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance and Financial Regulation, a lot of important and interesting information was brought
to the surface.
“First, almost all funds report that their portfolio managers receive variable bonus-type
compensation as opposed to fixed salary. Second, the bonus component of compensation is
explicitly tied to the fund’s investment performance for 79.0% of sample funds. The performance
evaluation window ranges from one quarter to ten years, and the average evaluation window is
three years. Third, for about half the sample, the manager’s bonus is directly linked to the overall
profitability of the advisor. Fourth, only 19.6% of sample funds explicitly mention that the
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advisor considers the fund’s AUM when deciding manager bonuses. Finally, deferred
compensation is present in almost 30% of the sample funds” (Ma, Tang, and Gomez, 2018).
From this, it can be concluded that fund manager performance is a key driver in fund
manager compensation. With this type of incentive, one would think that fund mangers would be
doing everything they can to outperform the market and be successful in doing so, especially with
their own compensation on the line. However, as previously mentioned, the research shows that
less than 8% of funds outperform the market. This further proves how difficult it is to outperform
the market, providing even more influence to pick indexed funds over actively managed ones.
Also, as stated by Ma, Tang, and Gomez, it is very uncommon to see a fund manager’s
compensation being linked to assets under management. This means that fund managers’ main
incentive is based off fund performance, yet that metric is normally below benchmark. It is very
interesting to see how fund manager compensation is determined and how it has affected
management style and incentives over the past twenty years. As time progresses, actively
managed funds have noticed that one of their top unattractive features is higher fees, which is
supposed to be offset by superior returns compared to the market. With this feature only being
true for less than 8% of funds per year, the attractiveness of actively managed funds drops
significantly.

Decline or Normalization?
The actively managed funds market seems as though it has been in decline for quite some
time as it continuously sees outflows to passively managed funds. However, there is a lot of
evidence supporting the case that this market is simply returning to the mean or being normalized.
A study conducted by Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh of The National Bureau of
Economic Research investigates reasons as to why the active management industry is still popular
even with regards to its very poor track record. In their study, they find that the “large size of the
active management industry can be rationalized by decreasing returns to scale in the industry”
(Pastor and Stambaugh, 2012). To understand this, the phrase return to scale must be explained.
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As stated in the Encyclopedia Britannica, this phrase refers to the quantitative change in output
resulting from a proportional increase in inputs. Therefore, decreasing returns to scale means the
more inputs are increased, the more the return of the output is decreased.
In terms of the actively managed funds market, the inputs would consist of the amount of
assets being allocated to the market while the output would be the funds performance. Thus, as
the active management market expanded, the returns the funds generated were decreasing.
However, as the size of the market proportionally shrinks compared the indexed funds market, as
it is currently, the returns actively managed funds generate are expected to increase. This results
in the normalization of the market as returns of these funds revert to the mean.
In analyzing the downward trend of actively managed funds, it is very clear that there are
four non-quantitative factors that have shown major influence upon this market. These include the
attractiveness of indexed funds, fund manager styles, expense ratios and the normalization of the
market. Identifying and understanding these factors allows investors to better understand the
inner workings of this market, which can help create safer and more reliable portfolios. Also, it
helps explain the drastic rise of passively managed funds.

Research Questions
As provided by the title, this sub section is devoted to the formulation of research
questions drawn from the related literature above. This paper conducts tests that attempt to
answer the following questions:
•

What causes the major asset fluctuations from active to passive funds over the past 20 years?
o

•

Is there data that supports the attractiveness of indexed funds?
o

•

Does this conclusion differ for the three subperiods?

Does this conclusion differ for the three subperiods?

Does fund management style play a significant role in performance, popularity or asset
retention of U.S. equity funds?
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•

What role does expense ratios serve in terms of performance, popularity or asset retention in
U.S. equity funds?

•

Is the actively managed funds market in decline or simply reverting to the mean?
These research questions encompass most of the questions that arise from the above

literature. However, the combination of these questions and their results help answer the main,
overarching question that this research is aimed toward solving. That question is “Where is the
future of the actively managed funds market headed in conjunction to indexed funds and is this
move significant?”. From the related literature above, a hypothesis can be formulated which
concludes that with the advance of technology and availability and readiness of information,
actively managed funds will continue to revert to the mean by taking advantage of decreasing
economies of scale in terms of funds performance and moving into emerging markets where
information is scarce and where fund managers can generate abnormal profits from mispriced
securities. Thus, actively managed funds will move into a riskier asset class, while indexed funds
will continue to grow as the main source of safe, retirement saving investments. Using the sample
that will be discussed in Section 3, this hypothesis will be tested in Section 4 and concluded in
Section 5.

Section 3: Sample and Data
As stated in Section 1, a sample of sixty U.S. equity funds are used to run tests against
the hypothesis. These funds can be found in Figure C in the appendix. The sixty funds collected
are evenly split into two categories where thirty are actively managed funds with the other thirty
being passively managed funds. Also, the funds are selected to cover the main eleven sectors and
nine management styles. The sectors include consumer discretionary, consumer staples,
communication services, financials, technology, industrials, health care, real estate, materials,
energy and utilities, while the management styles include large-cap growth, value and blend, midcap growth, value and blend and small-cap growth, value and blend. Encompassing this wide
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variety of funds adds to the testing power of the sample and helps eliminate any style or
management biases that may be present.
Moving on to the data of each fund, there are six data fields that were collected over the
twenty-year time period. These include yearly gross returns, total fund assets in millions, beta, net
asset value, Sharpe ratio and expense ratio. Figure D provides an example of what this would
look like. There are a total of 101 data points for each firm, resulting in roughly 6,060 data points.
Also, the range of data points that total fund assets creates is massive, ranging from below $1
million all the way to over $400 billion. To shrink this range and make it more suitable for
testing, the natural log (LN) is taken of each total fund asset data point. Therefore, all references
to this data field are logged total fund assets in millions, unless specifically noted.
As with any financial research, a market benchmark must be provided. For this study, the
S&P 500 is used as it best exemplifies the funds that are chosen for the research. The ticker,
“SPY”, which is an index that completely tracks the S&P 500, is used to obtain the necessary data
fields. As seen in Figure E, these data fields include total yearly returns, beta and Sharpe ratio,
which adds on another thirty data points to the testing power. Obtaining all these data points
concludes the sample that will be used throughout Sections 4 and 5.

Section 4: Empirical Tests and Results
Simple Tests
This section provides the tests, the details and conditions of a specific test, followed by
the results. A visual in the form of a graph or table is provided when applicable. Also, this section
starts with broad tests that help convey the central ideas and move into more specific tests as the
paper continues.
The first test is reported in Figure F. This test is simple as it takes the average and median
of all yearly returns for active and passive funds. The figure shows that on average, the sample of
active funds outperformed indexed funds by 0.94%. However, this test has a p-value that is
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greater than 10%, showing that it is insignificant. Also, as seen in Figure G, active funds, on
average, implement an expense ratio that is 0.54% higher than passive funds. The test results
from Figures F and G prove that the difference in fund performance between active and passive
funds is not significant, which shows that investors should not make decisions based on the
performance of other funds and instead look for other underlying factors. This happens to be a
common theme throughout the rest of the tests in this study.
The next test deals with logged total fund assets in millions, which can be found in Figure
H. The chart shows that, on average, passive funds have roughly $1.2 million more assets than
active funds when total fund assets are logged. This test aligns with the Morningstar article
written by Tom Lauricella and Gabrielle DiBenedetto as previously mentioned in this paper.
Active funds have seen eleven years of outflows over the past twelve years, while passive funds
have only increased in assets under management. This test also has a p-value smaller than 1%,
showing that it is extremely significant and that there is a concrete difference between the total
fund assets of active and passive funds.

Style and Sector Specific Tests
This next test looks for relationships between active and passive funds that reside in the
same management style or sector. However, this test does not hold much testing power, as there
are sixty funds total with eleven different sectors and nine different management styles.
Nonetheless, the results of this test are still worth inspecting as they can provide a different
perspective on the topic.
Starting with management style, active funds, on average, outperform passive funds in
large-cap growth, large-cap value and small-cap growth management styles. Passive funds, on
average, only outperform active funds in the mid-cap growth management style. The remaining
five categories are not tested as the sample did not provide funds of the specific management
style in active and/or passive funds. However, out of all the available information, the p-values of
the tests show no statistical significance. Aligning with the results from Figure F, this shows that,
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on average, there is no significant difference between active and passive fund performance, even
when considering the specificity of management style.
Sector specific fund performance yields similar results to the previous test. On average,
active funds outperform passive funds in the following sectors: communication services,
consumer staples, energy, financials, health care, industrials, technology, real estate and
materials. On the contrary, passive funds, on average, outperform active funds in both the
consumer discretionary and utilities sectors. However, all eleven sectors resulted in p-values that
are greater than 10%, showing no statistical significance. Aligning with the results from both
Figure F and the management style test, this shows that, on average, there is no significant
difference between active and passive fund performance, even when considering the specificity of
sector specific funds.

Regression Analysis
Utilizing regression analysis generates some interesting and useful findings in terms of
the relationships between active and passive funds, amongst other variables. A total of two main
tests are conducted for this section. However, to add specificity, there are many “sub-tests” that
make use of the three time periods that break up the twenty-year span.
The first overarching test is based off the following equation: R(e) = constant + passive
fund + market return + total fund asset. Plugging in the numbers from Figure J, the regression
result is R(e) = 4.7122 – 0.7251x + 0.9969Rm – 0.3693a, where “x” is the passive indicator,
“Rm” is the return of the market benchmark and “a” is total logged assets in millions. Setting the
passive indicator to 0, the market return to 0 and averaged total logged assets to one million
yields an average active fund gross return of 4.35%. The average passive fund gross return is
3.62% when setting the passive indicator to one and keeping the other variables the same as
before. This shows that on average, actives outperform passives by 0.73% when holding the
market and total fund assets constant. This gap widens when realistic numbers are used in the
equation. The average market return over the past twenty years is 7.68% and averaged total
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logged assets in millions for active funds are 7.35 and 8.55 for passive funds. The equation
outputs an average expected return of 9.96% for active funds and 8.53% for passive funds,
showing an outperformance of 1.16% by active funds.
The market beta has a p-value of less than 1%, showing that it is highly significant. The
relationship is positive, meaning an active or passive funds’ performance is directly linked to
market performance, which is to be expected. Looking to asset beta, this variable is significant as
well, holding a p-value of less than 5%. This aligns perfectly with the study conducted by Lubos
Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh, stating that the relationship between fund performance and
assets undermanagement is decreasing in economies of scale. On average, as total fund assets
increase, returns go down. Lastly, the p-value for the passive indicator is greater than 10%,
showing that there is no direct relationship between the performance of one fund compared to
another. Therefore, it is more useful to consider, as an investor or advisor, variables such as the
conditions of the market and fund asset fluctuations when selecting a fund, instead of looking at
the performance of the fund’s competition.
Diving into more specific settings, this test is also run on the three time periods, as seen
in Figure K. Due to the shortening of the time periods, the data points that are available for testing
dramatically decrease, lowering testing power. However, these tests still provide an interesting
perspective on any eye-catching data or outliers. Looking at the passive and market betas, it is
quite clear that they perfectly align with the test results for the overall time period. However, the
asset beta holds no significance in the three separate time periods but holds significance in the
overall time period. This would suggest that the idea of funds having a decreasing economies of
scales effect in terms of fund performance related to total funds assets is only present in the long
run. This is further supported by the positive asset beta from 2014 to 2019. A massive influx of
assets into funds caused by the rapid rise of the market has the potential to benefit fund
performance. However, the tests show that this is only in the short run and that a decreasing
economies of scale relationship between the two variables will likely surface in the future. To
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conclude, in the first regression test, this information would allow investors to be even more
strategic in the selection of funds, especially when considering short- or long-term financial
goals.
The next regression test closely follows the conditions and data of the first time, except
that it replaces average fund return with average fund Sharpe ratio. This metric is a popular
financial ratio that helps investors to better evaluate a security’s returns when compared to its
risk. The formatting of this test is similar to the above, starting with the overall time period
followed by specific measures from the three time periods.
This test utilizes the same regression equation as the first regression test, R(e) = constant
+ passive fund + market Sharpe ratio + total fund asset. Using Figure L as a reference, the
equation in its base form reads R(Sharpe) = 0.1992 – 0.0355x + 0.7828Sm – 0.0070a, where “x”
is the passive indicator, “Sm” is the average market Sharpe ratio and “a” is total logged assets in
millions. Setting the passive indicator to zero, the market Sharpe ratio to zero and averaged total
logged assets to one million yields an average active fund Sharpe ratio of 0.6721. The average
passive fund Sharpe ratio is 0.6254 when setting the passive indicator to one and keeping the
other variables the same as before. With a higher Sharpe ratio by 0.0467, active funds boast
slightly higher returns with lower risk when compared to passive funds. This gap also widens
when realistic numbers are used in the equation. The average market Sharpe ratio over the past
twenty years is 0.6759 and averaged total logged assets in millions for active funds are 7.35 and
8.55 for passive funds. The equation outputs an average expected Sharpe ratio of 0.6766 for
active funds and 0.6326 for passive funds, showing an outperformance of 0.044 by active funds.
The market beta, with a p-value less than 1%, is highly significant. Like the previous
regression test, this shows that the market directly affects the performance and risk of both active
and passive funds in a linear fashion. As expected, an increase in the market Sharpe ratio would
result in an increase in fund Sharpe ratio. Also, the asset beta is significant with the p-value being
less than 5%. With the asset beta being negative, this shows that fund Sharpe ratio is related to
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total fund assets by decreasing economies of scale, which coincides with the results from the
above regression. However, the passive indicator shows no significance. Aligning with the above
tests results from the first regression, this shows that fund Sharpe ratio has no clear relationship
with competing funds and are not affected by those funds’ performance.
Moving into a more specific timeline, these next tests revolve around any discrepancies
or striking results from the three time periods. Referring to Figure M, the only consistent variable
is the market beta, which is to be expected. Starting with the passive beta, the p-value shows
significance exclusively in the 2008 Financial Crisis time period. However, given the
unprecedented circumstances of the time, it is safe to say that this result can be labeled as an
outlier. The crash of the market led to a huge downturn for many passive funds, which explains
the size of the passive beta. This would cause the active-passive relationship to be significant
because active fund managers could simply take money out of the market and not suffer the
downside, while passive funds had to simply ride the market. Thus, the competition directly
affects fund performance. The asset beta sees a positive metric from 2005 to 2013 and from 2014
to 2019, while also gaining significance in the latter. However, there is evidence that the above
explanation is still valid. An unusual and strong stimulus in the market in the short run would
reverse the decreasing economies of scale relationship between total fund assets and fund Sharpe
ratio. However, as seen in Figure M, this significance can be labeled as a special occasion caused
by volatility in the market. Therefore, it is safe to say that fund Sharpe ratio, like fund return,
experiences decreasing economies of scale in relation to total fund assets. Overall, this a lot to
take away from these two regression equations. However, the majority of the results yielded by
the equations are consistent with one another, adding to the credibility of the test results.

Section 5: Conclusion
Throughout the course of this paper, there has been a plethora of data and information
that has been discussed and analyzed. There has been many different findings and results brought
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into the mix as well. Despite having a few outliers, most of the data seems to be pointing to one
overarching theme about active and passive funds. That theme is that there seems to be no
significant difference between active and passive funds. Therefore, the performance of an active
fund has no direct relationship with the performance of an otherwise similar index fund and vice
versa. However, the major factors that contribute to performance fluctuations are the market and
total fund assets. The market, as to be expected by investors, has a positive relationship with fund
performance for both active and passive funds. Total fund assets have a relationship of decreasing
economies of scales with fund performance over the long run. As more investors put assets into a
fund, fund performance, on average, decreases. By taking advantage of market metrics and fund
asset fluctuations, investors can develop an investment strategy that is more likely to have higher,
steadier profits with lower risk exposure.
Referring to the original point of the previous paragraph, the theme that is found in the
sample of funds provides some insight as to why there have been so many outflows in active
funds, while passive funds continue to grow more and more popular. As stated in Section 4,
active funds, on average, have an expected return of 9.69%, outperforming passive funds by
1.16%. The questions as to why passive funds are gaining popularity over actives despite having
a lower return on average resides in this theme. With no clear-cut difference between these two
types of funds, investor will naturally look at which fund is returning higher profits with lower
risk. At a first glance, this would still mean that active funds should be more popular than passive
ones. However, when factoring in the data from Figure G, that advantage gap of 1.16% that active
funds boast is reduced to 0.62% by expense ratios. Also, there is always the risk of human error.
Investing in an active fund puts faith in the skillset of the fund manager, but no one can predict
the market. Thus, having a fund manager elevates that risk of that fund due to human error, which
elevates active fund risk and roughly leveling the advantage gap between these two types of
funds. This is a viable explanation as to why there have been so many asset fluctuations from
actives to passives over the last twenty years. Investors feel they are earning consistent profits
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with less risk when invested in a passive fund that mimics an index instead of relying on a fellow
human being to outperform an unpredictable market.

Fund Managers Becoming Obsolete
As technology advances, the use of automation has become more and more common in
everyday life. This brings up the question as to whether the job of fund managers is becoming
obsolete. In a study conducted by Frank J. Fabozzi, Sergio Focardi and Caroline Jonas, it is found
that “the growing automation of the equity investment process indicates that that there is no
missing link in the technology chain that leads to automatic quantitative management” (Fabozzi,
Focardi, and Jonas, 2009). It goes on to describe how the quantitative models used for the
management of indexed funds is now being edited so it contains optimization algorithms. Then,
the newly formed quantitative model is used to maintain actively managed funds with no human
management.
This breakthrough in technology could serve as a big problem to fund managers who
would be at risk of losing their jobs. However, there has been one problem that seems to be
consistent with each automated actively managed fund. “The wide use of models has created a
number of challenges: survey respondents say that differentiating quantitative products and
improving on performance are a challenge” (Fabozzi, Focardi, and Jonas, 2009). Since the
algorithms for optimization are fundamentally similar, they tend to pick the same stock
selections, resulting in minimal ways to differentiate between products and allowing for very little
improvement of performance. The sole fact that optimization has allowed for the automation of
actively managed funds is still a threat to fund managers. However, with the introduction of
emerging markets, there are potentially new ways to generate better returns than automated funds
with human fund managers.

Emerging Markets
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As actively managed fund performance struggles to beat the market while continuing to
impose elevated expense ratios when compared to indexed funds, fund managers must look to
different strategies in hopes of turning asset outflows into inflows. One article pulled from the
Wall Street Journal written by Eleanor Laise describes a strategy that involves emerging markets.
She explains that fund managers should investigate “asset classes like small-company stocks,
where a stock picker's research can sniff out undervalued companies overlooked by the market”
(Laise, 2007). The reasoning behind this is that “it can be tough for active managers to uncover
information that gives them an edge on the market” for companies that are well established and
matured. Mispriced assets are more likely to be found in emerging markets with little company
information, which can lead to more consistent and higher performance by actively managed
funds. This added risk would also help explain higher expense ratios in these funds.

The Future of Actively Managed Funds
At a brief glance, the actively managed funds market may seem that it is headed in a
downward direction. However, when taking a more in-depth look, this market has a lot of
potential to make a comeback against passively managed funds. As previously shown, there is no
real difference between these two types of competing funds. Also, when accounting for expense
ratios and risk, passive funds will likely return the same profits as active funds with slightly lower
risk, leading investors to pour money into ETF’s. This also helps explain Glen Hubbard’s
statement, “passive funds have become the bedrock foundation for retirement saving in the
United States”.
With passive funds slowly taking over the “safe, reliable equity funds” section of the
market, this leaves a potentially profitable section of the market open. This study predicts that
fund managers of active funds will move into this section of the market, which happens to be
emerging markets. With less available information, emerging markets can be taken advantage of
in terms of finding mispriced assets, which can lead to higher profits. Fund managers will utilize
their skillsets in selecting securities that have been mispriced. However, active funds will
20

naturally become riskier, which can help explain the elevated expense ratios that these funds
charge. Also, active funds will retain less assets, since they will become riskier, which benefits
returns from the decreasing economies of scale relationship to total fund assets. Therefore,
passively managed funds will continue to grow in popularity and asset size and serve as a staple
of the retirement saving as a safe, low risk, low expense, consistent security. Active funds will
become a riskier asset that revolves around security selection strategies dealing with mispriced
assets in emerging markets. This prediction appears to be most viable and most supported by the
data and information from this study. Both sides of the market spectrum (high return/high risk vs.
low return/low risk) will be covered and fund managers will slowly turn the active funds industry
around, reinstating themselves as an essential part of the market.
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Appendix
Figure A: Total net assets of the U.S. mutual funds market from 1998 to 2018 (Lauricella
and DiBenedetto, 2019)

Figure B: U.S. equity fund flows (Lauricella and DiBenedetto, 2019)
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Figure C: Sample of U.S. equity funds
Active
Name
Vanguard Equity-Income Fund
Vanguard Dividend Growth Fund
Vanguard Growth and Income Fund
Vanguard Mid-Cap Growth Fund
Loomis Sayles Small Cap Growth Fund
Fidelity Blue Chip Growth Fund
Fidelity Small Cap Stock Fund
Fidelity Mid-Cap Stock Fund
Fidelity Large Cap Stock Fund
Fidelity Growth Strategies Fund
Laudus U.S. Large Cap Growth Fund
T. Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth Fund
Morgan Stanley Institutional Growth Fund
Commerce MidCap Growth Fund
Wasatch Ultra Growth Fund
Vanguard Energy Fund
Vanguard Health Care Fund
Fidelity Select Communication Services Fund
Fidelity Select Consumer Discretionary Fund
Fidelity Select Consumer Staples Fund
Fidelity Select Financial Services Fund
Fidelity Select Industrials Fund
T. Rowe Price Global Technology Fund
T. Rowe Price Real Estate Fund
Wells Fargo Utility and Telecommunications Fund
Fidelity Select Gold Portfolio
BlackRock Technology Opportunities Fund
T. Rowe Price Financial Services Fund
Cohen & Steers Institutional Realty Fund
Dodge & Cox Stock Fund

Ticker
VEIPX
VDIGX
VQNPX
VMGRX
LSSIX
FBGRX
FSLCX
FMCSX
FLCSX
FDEGX
LGILX
TRBCX
MSEGX
CFAGX
WAMCX
VGENX
VGHCX
FBMPX
FSCPX
FDFAX
FIDSX
FCYIX
PRGTX
TRREX
EVUAX
FSAGX
BGSAX
PRISX
CSRIX
DODGX

Sector
Large-cap Value
Large-cap Growth
Large-cap Growth
Mid-cap Growth
Small-cap Growth
Large-cap Growth
Small-cap Growth
Mid-cap Blend
Large-cap Value
Large-cap Growth
Large-cap Growth
Large-cap Growth
Large-cap Growth
Mid-cap Growth
Small-cap Growth
Energy
Health Care
Communications Services
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Financial
Industrials
Technology
Real Estate
Utility
Materials
Technology
Financial
Real Estate
Large-cap Value

Passive
Name
Vanguard 500 Index Fund
Vanguard Growth Index Fund
Rydex NASDAQ-100 Fund
Vanguard Value Index Fund
Vanguard Extended Market Index Fund
Vanguard Small-Cap Index Fund
Vanguard Small Capitalization Index Fund
Schwab Total Stock Market Index Fund
Fidelity 500 Index Fund
PowerShares QQQ Fund
Schwab S&P 500 Index Fund
Schwab Small Cap Index Fund
SPDR S&P 500 ETF
iShares S&P 500 Index ETF
iShares S&P SmallCap ETF
Vanguard Real Estate Index Fund
SPDR Materials Select Sector ETF
Utilities SPDR ETF
DFA Real Estate Securities ETF
iShares Dow Jones US Telecom
Consumer Discretionary SPDR ETF
Consumer Staples Select Sector SPDR ETF
iShares S&P Global Energy Sector ETF
Financial Select Sector SPDR ETF
Health Care SPDR ETF
Industrial Select Sector SPDR ETF
Technology Select Sector SPDR ETF
iShares Expanded Tech-Software ETF
iShares Dow Jones US Financial ETF
Energy Select Sector SPDR ETF

Ticker
VFIAX
VIGAX
RYOCX
VVIAX
VEXAX
VSMAX
NAESX
SWTSX
FXAIX
QQQ
SWPPX
SWSSX
SPY
IVV
IJR
VGSLX
XLB
XLU
DFREX
IYZ
XLY
XLP
IXC
XLF
XLV
XLI
XLK
IGV
IYF
XLE

Sector
Large-cap Blend
Large-cap Growth
Large-cap Growth
Large-cap Value
Mid-cap Growth
Small-cap Blend
Small-cap Blend
Large-cap Blend
Large-cap Blend
Large-cap Growth
Large-cap Blend
Small-cap Growth
Large-cap Blend
Large-cap Blend
Small-cap Blend
Real Estate
Materials
Utility
Real Estate
Communications Services
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Energy
Financial
Health Care
Industrials
Technology
Technology
Financial
Energy

Figure D: Example of a fund’s data points
VEIPX - Vanguard Equity-Income Fund
Date
Gross yearly return Total fund assets (in millions) Beta
Sharpe ratio
Net Asset Value Expense ratio
12/29/2000
13.5268
2561.41 -0.3974
0.45025863
24.44
0.27%
12/31/2001
-2.3448
2491.41 4.3257 -0.322402907
22.71
12/31/2002
-15.6512
2235.8 1.0248 -0.726508724
18.7
12/31/2003
25.1389
3070.62
0.743 1.597417763
22.31
12/31/2004
13.5745
3843.25 0.8035 1.180926016
23.5
12/30/2005
4.3709
4289.8 1.3943
0.11701475
22.79
12/29/2006
20.6228
5292.71 1.3217 1.603881896
25.3
12/31/2007
4.8561
5375.25 1.4363
0.02587743
24.42
12/31/2008
-30.9547
3604.63 0.7242 -0.818790469
16.14
12/31/2009
17.1013
4040.81 0.7585 0.616075311
18.25
12/31/2010
14.8813
4898.4 0.1314 0.906300607
20.38
12/30/2011
10.6049
6619.95 0.3295 0.529237678
21.9
12/31/2012
13.4867
9690.3
0.21 1.070413859
24.15
12/31/2013
30.0713
15546.46 0.7999 2.878854122
29.76
12/31/2014
11.2898
18794.24 1.0081 1.088312687
31.21
12/31/2015
0.7739
18978.61 0.8384 0.049194883
29.56
12/30/2016
14.7004
25360.81
1.524 1.163268975
32.62
12/29/2017
18.3841
31341.21 0.3701 2.648174726
37.19
12/31/2018
-5.716
30085.02 1.1214 -0.554717907
31.7
12/31/2019
25.2163
39249.6 0.9828 2.149629784
37.96
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Figure E: Market benchmark data points
Dates

SPX

Beta

Sharpe Ratio

12/29/2000

-9.1014

0.94

-0.677680275

12/31/2001

-11.8904

3.16

-0.598599425

12/31/2002

-22.0975

1.07

-0.910965545

12/31/2003

28.6652

1.18

1.619974579

12/31/2004

10.8757

0.78

0.852774649

12/30/2005

4.9069

1.6

0.166666628

12/29/2006

15.7767

0.63

0.913132986

12/31/2007

5.5713

1.02

0.076442366

12/31/2008

-36.9999

1.04

-0.934783348

12/31/2009

26.4481

1.18

0.964710959

12/31/2010

15.0587

1.37

0.826794064

12/30/2011

2.1055

2.33

0.088598613

12/31/2012

15.9932

7.76

1.111456077

12/31/2013

32.3742

0.84

2.919203614

12/31/2014

13.6783

0.96

1.199758176

12/31/2015

1.3749

1.24

0.08615032

12/30/2016

11.9524

0.66

0.886601043

12/29/2017

21.8228

0.85

2.987881848

12/31/2018

-4.3918

0.84

-0.417995525

12/31/2019

31.4777

1.26

2.357940352

Figure F: Active and passive return comparison
Active Returns Passive Returns 2tail P-value
Mean Median Mean Median
0.44111625
9.962 11.22
9.02 12.23

Figure G: Expense ratio comparison
1.00%

0.72%

0.50%

0.18%

0.00%
Active

Passive

Figure H: Active and passive logged total assets comparison (in millions)
Active Fund Assets Passive Fund Assets 2tail P-value
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
4.62242E-25
7.34634 7.40126 8.55127 8.80442
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Figure I: Style and sector specific fund performance comparison
Style/Sector
Large-cap Growth
Large-cap Value
Large-cap Blend
Mid-cap Growth
Mid-cap Value
Mid-cap Blend
Small-cap Growth
Small-cap Value
Small-cap Blend
Communications Services
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Energy
Financial
Health Care
Industrials
Technology
Real Estate
Materials
Utility

Mean Active Return
8.307708571
9.254998333
#N/A N/A
8.6894475
#N/A N/A
10.45379
10.4458
#N/A N/A
#N/A N/A
10.11551
8.72356
10.387315
11.47492
8.71906
13.17015
11.73656
12.93343158
12.97185128
10.45589
8.91839

Mean Passive Return
8.613830508
8.371394737
8.028926496
10.56483684
#N/A N/A
#N/A N/A
9.73783
#N/A N/A
10.86767414
3.562894737
10.550255
8.420245
8.499994737
7.079684615
8.601695
9.133095
10.21822368
12.73573158
8.974355
9.49887

2tail P-value
0.935272265
0.853762489
#N/A N/A
0.751943011
#N/A N/A
#N/A N/A
0.897606255
#N/A N/A
#N/A N/A
0.369310223
0.773218129
0.648109309
0.643812855
0.735693449
0.386191504
0.687948936
0.674676545
0.957491809
0.858419393
0.91849336

Figure J: Comparison of active to passive performance holding the market and total fund
assets constant
constant
t-stat
p-value (stars)

4.712182
3.386588
***

passive beta
passive t-stat
p-value (stars)

-0.725114
-1.029367
none

market beta
market t-stat
p-value (stars)

0.996902
51.20011
***

asset beta
asset t-stat
p-value (stars)

-0.363881
-2.021405
**

number of observations
adjusted R squared

1105
0.706955
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Figure K: Comparison of active to passive performance holding the market and total fund
assets constant amongst the 3 time periods
constant
t-stat
p-value (stars)

9.208667813 constant
2.686220087 t-stat
***
p-value (stars)

2.215759777 constant
1.065930985 t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

-3.57573717
-1.512554608
none

passive beta
passive t-stat
p-value (stars)

-3.016057094 passive beta
-1.584219284 passive t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

-1.23461887 passive beta
-1.211474325 passive t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

-0.918538667
-0.899424109
none

market beta
market t-stat
p-value (stars)

0.973055573 market beta
20.38290702 market t-stat
***
p-value (stars)

1.053124614 market beta
41.25510574 market t-stat
***
p-value (stars)

0.95835585
24.92625727
***

asset beta
asset t-stat
p-value (stars)

-0.306560254 asset beta
-0.656633819 asset t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

-0.062458605 asset beta
-0.224924604 asset t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

0.386217158
1.371069892
none

531
number of observations
0.765188702 adjusted R squared

360
0.635641336

number of observations
adjusted R squared

214
0.66336746

number of observations
adjusted R squared

Figure L: Comparison of active to passive Sharpe ratio holding the market and total fund
assets constant

constant
t-stat
p-value (stars)

active
0.199221
2.362602
**

passive beta
passive t-stat
p-value (stars)

-0.035503
-0.826448
none

market beta
market t-stat
p-value (stars)

0.782845
42.25311
***

asset beta
asset t-stat
p-value (stars)

-0.007043
-0.641304
none

number of observations
adjusted R squared

1114
0.624693
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Figure M: Comparison of active to passive Sharpe ratio holding the market and total fund
assets constant amongst the 3 time periods
constant
t-stat
p-value (stars)

active
0.528967953 constant
2.648525686 t-stat
***
p-value (stars)

active
-0.002334607 constant
-0.021441715 t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

active
-0.507606949
-2.864819491
***

passive beta
passive t-stat
p-value (stars)

-0.058233174 passive beta
-0.514948516 passive t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

-0.11182891 passive beta
-2.093167764 passive t-stat
**
p-value (stars)

-0.097868034
-1.2769771
none

market beta
market t-stat
p-value (stars)

0.889396814 market beta
16.67002037 market t-stat
***
p-value (stars)

0.867007143 market beta
34.45416142 market t-stat
***
p-value (stars)

0.741950075
25.59160097
***

asset beta
asset t-stat
p-value (stars)

-0.020628495 asset beta
-0.763319556 asset t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

0.018506921 asset beta
1.265956741 asset t-stat
none
p-value (stars)

0.062003518
2.933537636
***

number of observations
adjusted R squared

223
number of observations
0.557450664 adjusted R squared

531
number of observations
0.699872177 adjusted R squared

360
0.651294927
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